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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In reoent years the Amerioan people have heard and read a
great deal about congressional investigating committees, their
powers and their methods.

Of the great number of senators and

congressmen who have served on tbese commIttees at one time or
another, perhaps none bas enjoyed more publIcity than the controversial gentleman from Wisconsin, Senator Joseph R. McOarthy.
His name is mentioned here because throughout the numerous probes
he directed until his censure by the United states Senate, he wes
frequently on the receiving end of that power of the President ot
the United states with which we are here concerned, the power to
withhold information from Congress.

One recent instance of such

a refusal of information oocurred in Kay,
McCarthy hearings.

1954,

during the Army-

In the oourse of his testimony before the

Senate Committee on Government Operations,

~

Counselor John

Adems told of a meeting which had taken place several months
earlier between oertain top ottieials ot the Bisenhower Administr~tion.

When asked tor fUrther details of this oonference,

Adams refused to answer.

His position was supported and
1

•

2

clarified a few
. days later when the President issued a directive
to the Secretary of Defense, forbidding all employees of the
Defense Department appearing before the Senate Committee on
Government Operations to testify

o~ncerning

conversations or

communications exchanged within the Executive Department on
official matters.

Deeply chagrined, Senator MoCarthy called for

a recess to consider nthis unbelievable situation ... l
UnDelievable or not, the case is but one of many cases of a
similar nature which have occurred during the Roosevelt, Truman,
and Eisenhower administrations.

By what right, we could ask, may

the President of the United states withhold information from
Congress, even when his a.ction seems to be a hindrance to a valuable and worthwhile function of the legislative body?
words, what is the origin of this power?

In other

To answer this question

will be the first aim of this thesis.
The problem at hand begins to take on substance when we
recall that nowhere in the United states Constitution is there
explicit mention or acknowledgment of this presidential power
as such.

Further, in the one hundred and sixty-four years that

have elapsed since the origin of the power, and in the one hundred
and sixty since it was first exerCised, no statute dealing with
such a power has ever been passed.

And while there have been a

fair number of court cases which dealt with congressional powers

ITime Magazine, May 24, 1954, 26.

3
of inquiry,

t~e

presidential power to withhold information has

never been the subjeot of a Supreme Court deoision.
What then is the origin of this power?

History tells us

that the first president to withhold information from Congress
was George Washington.

It would be natural to suspect then that

Washington played an important part in determining the nature and
extent of the power, as well as the conditions required for its
invocation.

As will be seen later such was the case.

Nevertheles

one might still ask by what authorlty our first president established this power.

The answer In Washington's own words ls:

" • • • as 1t 1s essential to the due administration of the Government that the boundaries fixed by the Constitut10n between
the ditterent departments should be preserved, a just regard to
the Oonstitution and to the duty ot my offioe, under all the
circumstances of this case, forbids a complianoe with your
request. "2
The dootrine of separation of powers whioh establishes the
general independence ot the Executive, Legislative, and JudiCial
Branches of our government, was olearly Washington's justification ot his refusal.

It is not the purpose of this thesis to

oonsider the dootrine of separation ot powers, Whioh is the
remote foundation ot the President's prerogative in refusing

2MesSGses and Papers of the Presidents, ad. James D.
Riohardson, {NeW-York; l891T,-r; l88.

L
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information to. Congress.

Rather its aim will be to determine the

proximate origin of this power, and from an examination of the details of Washington's procedure in 1792 and 1796, to learn something of the nature of the power as it existed at the time ot its
institution.
It was mentioned that the power to withhold information is
not explicitly established in the Constitution, nor in an positive statute.

What then is the torce of this power?

When the

president exercises his right to withhold information, he acts
in accordanoe with his own interpretation of the Constitution.
Thus Washington acted, and such has been the procedure ot all
later presidents having recourse to the power.

However, there is

this considerable ditterence in the actions ot later presidents,
that they have had behind them the weight ot historical precedent.
American history abounds in the number ot instances in which
information has been withheld by the president or by heads ot
departments.

It would, therefore, have been a ter easier matter

to force President Monroe to back down on his retusal in 1825,
either through the threat ot impeaohment or by weight ot public
opinion, than it would be today.

In a word, the power, although

not enjoying the force ot law, has OOMe to be regarded as a
custom.

"A custom is the result or a long series of actions,

constantly repeated, which have, by such repetition, and by

L

5
uninterrupted

~cquiescence,

acquired the force ot a tacit and

common consent. "3
It is true that the general principle established by WashIngton in 1792, that information might be withheld whenever complianoe with a congressional request would prove incompatible
with the public intereat, admits of nUlllerous interpretations.
Moreover, at least in theory, any president has as much right to
apply the power acoording to this norm as Washington did, and
would have the right to

80

of historical preoedent.

interpret the Constitution regardless

Yet, the fact remains that the president

toda, would be much more reluctant to apply the power,-were it not
for the numerous historical precedents that have intervened since
its origin, for there would exist a much greater chance ot incurring the wrath of Congress and of the people, without such precedents.

The number of thea. precedents over the years has enor-

mously increased the strength and stability ot the power.

The

many innovations introduced in its application to new situations
have considerably broadened the nature and extent of the power,
If not in theory, then at least, and much more important, in
tact.

And the number ot precedents issuing from each new inno-

vation has increased the force ot the power in each of those
distinct and separate types ot application.

It is for this reason

.laenry Campbell Black, Black t s ~ Dictionary, 3rd ed.,
(st. Faul, 1933), 494.
..

L

I

that the I.cond aia ot this the.ia will be • thorough review :nd

,

examination of the many historical cases in which the President ot

the United states has withheld information from Congress.

The pur-

pose of this examination will be to determine the historical development of the power, to the end that a greater understanding might
be had ot its nature and extent as it exists in practIce

today~

The third question whioh might be asked, and whiph oertainly
can only be answered through a study ot this kind, is what are the
advantages and disadvantages of the power as it exists today.

This

of course oomes down simply to an inquiry into the advantages and
disadvantages whioh have tollowed from historical uaages ot the
power.

,

For example, what adVantage, it any, oan be tound in the

power when retusal obviously hampers Oongress in its work ot removing subversive elements from the government?

It will also be ot

value to try to determine whether the power has ever been abused,
although this is admittedly the moat diftioult feature of our
investigation.
Other than the briet and soattered aocounts of various oases
to be found in biographies of presidents, there has been no
thorough and conneoted investigation of this subject.

This treat-

ment, therefore, will be unique for the thoroughness of investigation it will give to the subject, as well as for its evaluation of
the development and present so ope of the power as established by
historioal preoedent.

L

1
The best
as the Annals

~ource

2!

material was found to be such primary sources

Congress, and its successors, the Congressional

Globe and Congressional Reoord.
proved to be invaluable also.

Letters of the various presidents
Secondary source materials, such

as biographies of presidents and works dealing with particular
periods, were more or less helpful, depending on whether the cases
to be considered had other important historioal implications.
There are a tew studies ot the congressional investigative power
whioh were moderately helpful.
A word of oaution seems in order at this point.

This thesis

does not attempt any sort ot investigation into the legal aspects

ot the problem.

Nor will any theorizing be done on an alternate

method of institution whioh early presidents might have followed,
or on how it might now be amended.

This is exclusively an

historical treatment of the subject, dealing with precedents
recorded in history and with the historical background of those
precedents.

All the conolusions of the thesis will be based

801ely upon historical evidence.

CHAPTER II
THE ORIGIN OF THE POWER
The President t • power to withhold information from Congress
was clearl 7 established b7 President George Washington in two
cases which arose during his administration.

In the first ot

these case •• concerning the infamous st. Clair expedition. although the conditions for the precedent were methodical17 set down,
no information was actually refused.

The first instance of a Pres-

ident exerCising the power did not come until four years later at
the close of Washington's second term of oftice.

These two cases

make up the subjeot matter 01' this chapter.
In the latter part of the summer ot 1790, Major General Arthur
st. Clair, Governor 01' the Northwest Territory, met with President
Washington in New York, to discuss the impending frontier campaign.
Aware 01' st. Clair's lack ot experience in the type ot wartare
carried on in the wilderness, the President was careful to warn
the General to be ever on his guard against the possibility ot
a surprise attack.

st. Clair proposed the establishment of a

military post at a so-called "Miami Village," near present-da7
Fort Wayne, Indiana, and he was ordered to proceed to Miami with
a force 01' two thousand men composed of regulars and militia.

8

By

9

the autumn ot 1791, it was assumed that these
process of

o~ders

were in

exe~ution.l

On December 9, 1791, word

~eached

the rresident that St.

Clair's expedition had sustained a tragic and ignominious deteat.
Attacked by the Indians near the Miami Village, the army had thro
away its weapons and tled in paniC, leaving all its cannon and muc
other equipment behind them.

Discipline was not restored to the

fleeing remnants until they were many ml1es from the scene ot the
disaster, and when invento17 was: tinally taken, the total casualties numbered more than nine hundred.

It was, says Freeman, the

most ghastly s.nd huml1iating experience ot the white man in Indian
wartare ainoe Braddock's deteat. 2
Feeling ran high ameng ottioials ot the Government and the
people as well.

On December 12, Washington sent to both house.

of Congress an ofticial report of the event, promising a further
communioation of all information neoessary tor the Legislature
to judge what measur •• should be taken to meet the situation.

st.

Clair's personal report ot the event was sent, complete and exaotly
as reo.i •• d.)
1

Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington, (New York,
1954), VI, )29.
2~., 336-339.

3~., 339.

>
10

Nevertheless, these and other reports sent to Congress during
the following months were evidently not suffioient in the ey•• ot
oertaln legi.latora.

A resolution was brought up in the Hou.e ot

Representatlves proposing that the President should be oalled upon
to institute an inquiry.

In the debate whioh tollowed, tbi. me.amw

met with widespread opposition on the part ot many who felt that
to phrase the ROtton in such a way was to imply a certain remisaness in the President'. performance ot his duty, a tact which, to
aay ,the least, was by no meana certain.

On March 27 this first

resolution was rejected, and in it. place another was passed which
stated: "Resolved, That a oommltte. be appointed to Inquire into
the cause. of the fallure ot the late expedition under
General

~~Jor

st. Clair; and that tbe said co_ittee be empowered to

oall for such persons, papera, and record., a. may be nece •• arf to
assist their lnqull"l ••• "4
Immedlately a request va. sent to SecretaPY ot War Knox tor
all the papers and letters, Includlng Washlngton's orlginal Instructiona, connected wlth the st. Clalr expedltion, and Knox in
tvn lald the matter betore the i'resldent top hls approval.

On

March 31 Washington oalled a meeting ot his oabinet, consisting ot
Hamilton, Knox, Jetferson, and Randolph.

He told them that he dld

not 1n any way question the propl"iety of the House'a procodure.

-

4Annals ot oonlress, 2nd Oongress, 1st Sess10n, (Washington,

1849), Ill,

4qo-~4.
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However, he telt that 1n as much as this was the tirst example of
such a request tor intormation and would, therefore, serve as a
precedent tor subsequent cases ot a similar nature, he was anxious
that it be hs.ndled thoughtfully and correctl,._
Cabinet again met on the same subject.

On April 2 the

Says Jetferson of the

meeting:
I'We were ot one mind. (1). that the House was an inquest,
and theretore might institute inqUiries. (2). that they
might call for papers generally. (3). that the Executive
ought to communicate such papers as the public good would
permit, and ought to retuse those the disclosures of which
would injure the public. Consequently were to exeroise a
disoretion. (4). that neither the commee nor House had a
right to oall on the head of a deptmt, who and whose papers
were under the Presidt. alone, but that the oommee should
instruct th~ir chairman to move the house to address the
President.";'
With this matter ot principle decided, Washington had no desire
to withhold any informat10n trom the House, and accordingly he
wrote to the Seoretary of War on April

4, directing him to

forward to the House all papers requested by their resolution. 6
The only dis.enter trom this op1nion was Hamilton, who agreed
on all po1nts except the last, that concern1ng the House's power
to call on heads ot departments.

He recognized that his own post

ot Secretary ot the Treasury was certainly subject to Congress on
lome points, as evidenced b,. the acts which created that office.

"Thomas Jetterson, tiThe Anas," Writings, ed. P. L. Ford,
Federal edition, (New York, 1904), It, ~13-!4.
6George Washington, Writings, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick,
(Washington, 1939), XXXII, l~.
.

12
Nevertheless, he still did not feel obliged to produce any and
every paper Congress might request.

Jefferson tells us ot this

opinion of Hamilton and adds that he thought Hamilton preferred
the question to remain vague, so that he might be able to subject
himself either to Congress or to the President according to his
own pleasure. 7
The report of the select committee ot the House on May 8,
1792 exonerated General st. Clair of all blame.

Consideration ot

this committee's report waa then referred to another oommittee
whose report was completed too late tor discuasion in the 1st
Session.

When Congress reconvened in the tall ot 1792 the matter

was taken up anew.

A debate took place in which it was moved to

demand the attendance ot the Seoretaries ot War and the Treasury
on the House.

Yet many members of the House opposed this motion,

some simply because they oould see no point to it; others, beoause they did not think the House had the power to demand the
presenoe of the oftioials in question.

14.

Consequently, on November

an alternate resolution was passed merely calling tor informa-

tion, not damanding the attendance ot the department heads.

Al-

though Secretary Knox did subsequently appea.r before the committe"
his appearance seems to have been entirel, voluntary.8

7Jetterson, Writings, II, 214.
8Annnals ~ Congress, 2nd Cong, 2nd S~ss, 679-89.

b

13
The st. Clair Case is an important one in American history.
Not only was it the first time a Congressional committee was appointed to investigate a matter involving the Executive branoh ot
the Government, it was also the first Congres8ional request
formation trom the Executive.

The House based its right to inves-

tigate on its oontrol over publio expenditure8 and appropriations.
Thus, although the House reoeived the fullest cooperation fro
the Fresident in the St-. Clair ease, and although no information
was refused, the certain oonditions tor future refusals of information were nonetheless clearly established, even pertaining to
department heads.
The second Washington ease, and the first in which information was refused to Congress, oonoerned Jay's Treaty ot 1794 with
Great Britain.

War had broken out between Great Britain and

France in 1793, pro.ising

8

profitable trade in wheat for the

United States with both belligerent nations.

Amerioan hopes were

ot short duration, however, for almost immediately Britain began
to seize all neutral vesaels trading with the Frenoh West Indies.
This served to heighten the triotion already existing with the
English over the retusal ot American oitizens to pay their debts
to English creditors, outstanding since the Revolution, together
with British reluotance to surrender their trading posts in the
Northwest Territory.

-

9 W• B. Binkley. The Povers

1937), 39-40.

---

2! !h!

President, (Garden City

14
As the United
. states was not prepared tor a war, President
Washington, in spite of certain dubious treaty obligations to
France, issued a proclamation of neutrality_
Justice John Jay to

~ngland

to work out a treaty covering the

ifarious points disputed by the two nations.
~n

He then sent Chief

America was clearly

no position to bargain, as the treaty clearly demonstrated.

To

Britain went the right of free naVigation and trading on the

~reat

~ississippi,

the payment of all outstanding American debt., and the

~reedomot

all American ports to British vessels.

lssue,t~e

impressment ot United states seamen, nothing was said.

Of the key

Public opinion was bitter against Washington, Hamilton and
Jay.

Jefferson, the leader of the Republicans, had already re-

signed aa Seoretary of State, and he opposed the treaty when he
realized that it would be a good issue on which to unify his party.
~e

treaty was submitted to the Senate, debated in secret for two

~eeks,

and then approved.

President Washington signed it on

~ugust 12, 1795. 10
One tact which should be kept in mind is that over this
ant ire episode there hangs the pall ot party politics.

The

Republicans were tradit10nally pro-French, and called the treaty
'the MOst hum11iating contract into which America has ever
~ntered."11

Ratification had been secured, but it was soon clear

10 C8rl Brent Swisher, American Constitutional Development,
(Cambridge, Mass., 1943), 78-79.
llAlbert J. Beveridge, The Lire of John Marahall, (Boston,
~919), II, 114.
- -

-

15

that the Repub.licans he.d not yet begun to f'ight.

The etf'ective-

ness of the treaty depended upon the appropriation of government
funds, an appropriation which could be voted only by the Republican dominated House of Representatives.

The controversy finally

boiled over in the form of' a resolution proposed in the House on
March 2, 1796, by Edward Livingston of' New YOl"'k.

The measure

stated: "Resolved. That the President 01' the United states be requested to lay before this House a copy of the instructions to the
Ministel'" of the United States who negotiated the treaty with Great
Britain, communicated by his message of the first ot March,
together with the correspondenoe and other doouments relative to
the said treaty.n12
In the debate which rolloved, Livingston was asked whether
the purpose of securing these papers was to contest the constitutionality of' the treaty or to bring about the impeachment of
Washington or Jay.

He answered that this remained to be seen and

that the main reason tor the call was that the House might be able
to deoide whether it would sanction the treaty or not.

The Fed-

eralists replied that the treaty was conducted in perfeot accord
with the Constitution, and they pointedly observed that aooording
to the.t same Constitution the House had absolutely no share in the
treaty-making power.13

I2Arinals

2!

Congress, 4th Congress, 1st Session, 426.

13 I bid., 42&0-29.

-
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This sanctioning of the treaty to which Livingston referred
was simply the voting of the appropriations necessary for carrying
the treaty into etfect.

The Republicans claimed that the House

could hardly be expected to vote intelligently on the matter without access to the requested papers and information.

They were

willing to admit the President·s constitutional right to refUse
this information, and on March 7, 'an amendment was inserted into
the resolution

.0 8S

to except "such ot the said papers as any

existing negotiations may render improper to be disolosed.«14
At this point the issue of the debate underwent a Change
from the original question ot whether intormation should be requested of the President, to whether the House enjoyed a share in
the treaty-making power at all.
rambled on.

For three weeks the debate

James Madison and Albert Gallatin were the principal

spokesmen for the Republicans, and Madisonts arguments were partic
ularly cogent and to the point.

The gist of his rather lengthy

speech was that sinoe treaties have the force ot law, the House
could not be a part of the law-making power of the government and
ret be excluded trom the treatr-making power, tor suoh an exolusio
would be to reduce it to a purely ministerial agency, an instrumental arm at the Exeoutive and the Senate.

Then too, he said the

the House could not be expeoted to appropriate
l1beration on the SUbject.

...........

14Ibid., 429-38 •

~lnds

without de-

The treaty was utterly dependent for

17
its efficacy, at least in this case, on the appropriation ot

.

funds by the House, and this was an argument both tor the House's
right to the desired papers, as well as tor the contention that
it shared in the treat~-making power. 15
It was March

24 before the House finally returned to the

original question of the request for information.

Livingston's

amended . resolution requesting the papers was put to a vote and
passed, sixty-two to thirty-seven. l6
The Federalists argued the matter during the following week,
suggesting that the desired papers had already been given to the
Senate and were at that moment on tile in the same building in
which they all sat.

Therefore, they pleaded, why debate for

eighteen days over papers which could have been obtained in as
many hours1 l7
On March

25

the President replied to the House that "he
would take the request of the House into·consideration. tf18 He
then wrote to his cabinet meMbers as tollows:
Sir: The Resolution moved in the House ot Representatives, for the papers relative to the negotiation ot
the Treaty with G. Britain having passed in the affirmative, I request your opinion,

-

15Ibid., 487-95.

16~., 759.

-

11 Ibid., 191.
18Washington, writings, XXXIV,

505.

18
Whether that bbancb or Conp-e.a hath, or hath not
a right, 'by the Constitution, to call for thoae papers?
whether, it it doe. not posseS8 the right, it
would be expedient under the clrculI1stances ot this
partioular oas8, to furnish them?
And, 1n either case, in what terms would it be
most proper to comply w1th, or to retus. the request of the House?
These opinIons in writing, and your fttendance,
will b. expected at ten o'clock tomorrow. 9
The cabinet was unanimously opposed to compliance with the resolution ot the House.

On March 30, WashingSon, following the ••

opinions" and especIally that ot Uamilton,20 Jteplied to the
House in a tone at onOe courteous but unyield1ng:

I trust that no part ot mJ oonduct has ever ind1cated
a disposItion to withhold any inforll1ation which the Constitution has enjoined upon the President as a duty to
give, or which could be required ot him by either Houae
of Congress as a right; and with truth I affirm that 1t
has been, as it will oontinue to be while I have the
honor to preside in the Government, mJ oonstant endeavor
to harmonize with the other branohe. thereot 80 far a8
the trust delegated to me b1 the people of tbe United
Stat •• and . , sen.e or the obligation it imposes to
flpre.erl!' proteot, and defend the Constitution" will
permit.
He pointed out rurther that the "nature ot foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must orten depend on
8ecrecy; • • • To 6ldmit, then, a ri~~t 1n the Bouse ot Representat1ves to demand and to have as a metter ot course all the
papers respecting a negot1ation w1th a fore1gn power would be to

191b1d.
20 Jobn S. Bassett,

II, 134.

!2! Federalist Szatem, (New York, 1901),
~re8ident.,

ed. James D. Rioh-
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establish a dangerous
precedent."
.

He reminded the House that

careful examination of the Constitution, the journals and
proceedings of the Federal Convention, and ot the state ratifying conventiona, proved conclusively that the House was .definitely
not intended to share in the treaty-making power of the government.

As for the Senate, whioh does share in this power, Wash-

ington again stressed the point that no information whatsoever
had been retused to that body at the time ot its delIberation
on the treaty.

FUrthermore, he said that sinoe the House had

no share in the treaty-making power, the only other purpose
whioh it seemed it could have had in its request was impeachment.
and that had not been specified in the resolution.

He concluded:

As, therefore, it is perfeotly clear to my understanding that the assent of the House of Representatives is not necessary to the validity ot a treaty;
as the treaty with Great Britain exhibits in itselt
all the objects requiring legislative prOVision, and
on these the papers called tor oan throw no light,
and as it i8 essential to the due administration ot
the Government that the boundaries fixed by the
Constitution between the difterent departments should
be preserved, a just regard to the Constitution and
to the duty ot my ottice, under all the cirCUMstances
of this case, forbid. a complianoe with your request.
Needless to say, the House Republicans were indignant at
this blunt refusal.

wrote Madison to Monroe: "I have no doubt

that the advice, and even the message itselt, were oontrived in
New York, where it was seen that if the rising torce of the Republicans was not crushed, it must speedily crush the British
party, and that the only hope ot success lay in tavoring an open

r_-------------------.
20

rupture with t?e President. ft22

On April 6 Representative Thomas

Blount proposed a resolution stating that even though the House
bad no share in the treaty-making power, in a oas8 such as this
in whioh the treaty concerned a matter subject to House control,

tbe House had not only a right, but even an obligation to de-

liberate on carrying the treaty into e£fect.

The resolution waa

passed on the following day by a vote ot fifty-seven to thirtytlve. 23 Another resolution was also passed on April 7, the same
day, in which the House denied the necessity of stating the purpose of its call tor information, when such information waa needed
for the constitutional operations of the Houae.24
The situation was indeed serious by this time.

Prom Senator

Rufus King of New York came the blunt announcement that unless
the House made the necessary appropriations, the Senate would
consider alL legislation at an end and the Union disso1ved. 25
Similarly, the Federalist Press threatened that they would see
the dissolution of the Union betore allowing the rejeotion ot
Jay's Treaty to preoipitate a war with England.

Seoretary ot the

Treasury Hamilton secured counter-resolutions from many of the

22Lettera and Other Writinss ot James Madison, FOurth PresiIdent 2! the UnItid states, (Sew York, 1884), II, 97.
23Annals

!! Congress, 4th Congress, 1st Session, 772-73.

24 Ibid., 782-83.
I~.

25Claude Bowers,

~98-99.

Jefferson end Hamilton, (Boston, 1925),
-
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~erchants

in

~is

home state of New York who stood to Burrer from

rejection of the treaty.

8

Pinally, a plan was devised by the

Federalists to have the Senate attaoh Jay's Treaty

8S

a rider to

three other treaties with Spain, Algiers, and the Indians. all of
~hich

were up for consideration at that time.

It was hoped that

the House would then be forced to yield in order to secure the
senate's ratification of these three other treaties.
~hismaneuver

However,

tailed when the House RepublIcans managed to out-

lVote the Federalists on the first three trea.tIes before the treaty
with Great Britain came up_

It is interesting to note, s81s

achaohner, that the Federalists dId not attempt to defend the
but concentrated their attaok on the faot that the House
no right to examine the treaty at 811. 26

~reaty,

~ad

'rhe next tew weeks were crucial.

John Adams writing on

April 19 speaks of the dangers of war or dissolution of the Union
~t

the House should refuse to make the necessary appropriations.

~I cannot deny." he said, nthe right of the House to ask for

papers, nor to express their opinions upon the merits ot a trea.ty.
~

ideas are very high of the rights and powers of the House ot

~.presentatives.

These powers may be abused, and in this instance

• • • But the faith and

~here

1s great danger that they will be.

~onor

ot the nation are pledged, and though the House cannot

~I

26Nathan Schachner, The Foundins Fathers, (New York, 1954),

~91-93.

---

22
approve, they pught to teel themselves bound.

Some persons still

think the Bouse will oomply.tt21
On April

15 debate on the treaty began onoe more in the

committee of the whole.
•

The turning point oame on April 28 with

the famoQs tlTomahawk Speeoh" ot Representative Fisher Ames.

Al-

though only thirty-eight years old, Ames was in very poor health,
and his speeoh on this oocasion almost cost him his lite.

Bis

eloqueno. in stressing the vital necessity ot avoiding war and
preserving the nation at any honorable cost turned the tide ot
opposition. 28

A vote ot fifty to torty-nine sent the matter trom

the committee of the whole to the Houae, and on April 30, by a
vote ot .fifty-one to torty-eight, legislation making the

neo-

essary appropriations 1n support ot the treaty was enacted by the
House, "exercising its recpgnized oonstitutional freedom ot
judgement. ft29
Although the question ot the Bouse's power with regard to
treaties has continued through the years to be a tavorite subject ot debate, there was not muoh that oould be said on the
President's retusal ot information.

This seoond case, unlike the

one ot tour years previous, was not Just a simple statement of
21Lettera of John Adams Addressed to His Wite, ed. Charles
Adams, TBoston, 1841), II, 222-~.---

~ancis

28Great Debates in American Historz. ed. Marion M. Miller,
(lew York, 191), ll,-rart I, 51-56.

-

29Annals

2! Congress, 4th Congress, 1st Session, 1291
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principle,

bu~

an abrupt retusal, and it could not be expected

to sit w;ell with the congressional house in question.

Moreover,

there was clearly present an element ot party politics, and this
rendered the

contro~.rsy

even more bitter.

The argument advanced

by the House Republicans that they were entitled to information

concerning any appropriation they were expected to make, was a
good one in those early days, and remains so even today.,

Never-

theless, Washington's detense ot his action 1n w1thholding the
papers called tor by the House definitely carried the day.
Whether,;the House should have a share in the treaty-making power
is an interesting question, worthy ot much oonsideration and
perhaps even ot a oonstitutional amendment.

Yet as Washington

pointed out in his letter of refusal, the plain faot is that the
Constitution did not at tQat time (nor does it today) include
the House in that power.

Inasmuch al it was the oontention ot

those Republicans demanding the information that the House did
possess such power over treaties, surrender of the information
would have been tantamount to admitting they were correot about
the treaty power.

With this taot in mind it is eaey to under-

.tand those words of the President: " • • • it is essential to the
due administration of the Government that the boundaries fixed by
the Constitution between the different departments be preserved.n)O

-

30Richardson, Messages ~ Papers 2!. ~ Presidents, I, 188.
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frotection of. the oonstitutional separation of powers demanded
a refusal of the information.
This was not the only reason for the President's refusal.
Even had the House not put forth such a bold interpretation of
the extent of its powers, but merely requested the information,
the President would have refused

any~al,

in order to preserve

the secrecy so essential to the negotiation of a treaty with a
foreign power.

The House itself recognized this in the amend-

ment which was passed to Livingston's resolution, excluding
"SUCh of the said papers as any existing negotiations may render
improper to be disclosed.")l
Thus did the House itselt recognize the constitutional right
of the President to refuse the information should he choose to
do so; thus did the President make the publio interest his norm
of action, for it MUst be in the public interest to protect the
powers of the Executive from encroachment by another bra.nch of
the government, and to proteot the principle of treaty-secrecy;
and thus was the precedent, outlined tour years before, firmly
establlshed. 32

3lAnnals ~ Congress, 4th Congress, 1st Session, 438.

32 (The best treatment of Washington's second case i.
McMaster, Historz of the People of the United states" II, 267-281;
Swisher, AmerIcan ainitrtutlonal-oeiiIopment, 78-83; and Schaohne
~ FoundIng Fathers, 389-393.}

CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER - I

Having oonsidered the origin of the power, we turn now to its
subseque~t

development.

Th1s ohapter will be devoted exclus1vely

to oases in whioh the President's refusal was based upon the
obligation imposed by the Constitution on every Chief Exeout1ve,
of proteoting his powers against Congressional enoroaohment, while
the chapter to tollow will deal with other Cases in which the
reason given for the retusal was ot a more specialized nature.
Since there are two cases whioh particularly stand out over the
years as the most vigorous and contested refusals ot information
to Congress, both designed to protect the President's prerogative,
both of them will be treated in this ohapter.
The first of these oases took place in the administration
of fresident Andrew Jaokson.

A really thorough treatment of

Jacksonts war on the United states Bank would require more spaoe
than could possibly be allowed here.

Nevertheless, certain de-

tails will be mentioned, as they contribute to a
standing of this case.
opposed the Bank.

tu~ler

under-

It is not perfectly olear Just why Jaokson

Was he really convinoed that the institution

was a menace to the lower olasses?
2$

Or was it merely a political

26
issue, on whieb he meant to capitalize to
As a matter of tact, the

~eal

reason was

combination of these and other reasons.

ino~ease

his following?

p~obably 8

very complex

At any rate, when in

July, 18)2, the bill for rechartering the Bank Came before the
president, Jackson vetoed it.

When later that same year he was

re-elected to the Presidency after so much public discussion ot
his veto, he considered his aotion gloriously vindicated.
the administration set out once and

the
"Nobility System" and its head, the United States Bank. l
Although the Bank

cha~te~

fo~

all to

And so

dest~oy

was not due to expire for

anothe~

three years, Jackson was determined to kill the institution as
soon as possible.

The

charte~

federal funds, unless the
otherwise.

made the Bank the depository ot

See~etary

ot the Treasury should order

Accordingly, the President decided to remove these

funds trom the Bank.

Because Secretary of the Treasury McLane

would have nothing to do with the move, he was promoted to the
state Department, and his position in the Treasury Department
was tilled by William J. Duane, a Philadelphia lawyer who had
signed the antll'Bank report in 1829.

This was the plan proposed

by Attorney-General Taney, who believed that while Congress itselt'
could not oontrol tederal funds, the Secretary could.

lArthur M. Sohlesinger, Jr.,

1945), 89-97.

--

!a!

Age

2!

Jackson, (Boston,

2Binkley, The Powers of the President, 77.

-

2
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But the Secretary would not.

Duane certainly must have known

what was expected of him when he took the position, yet he managed
to evade the issue, neither aocepting nor opposing the President's
point of .viewa

On September 14, 1933, Jackson finally suggested

to Duane that he resign, but to everyone's surprise, he retused.
When on the eighteenth Jaokson read a paper to his cabinet, a
fiery denunciation of the Bank, and Duane continued in his refusal
to remove either the funds or himself, the exasperated President
simply fired him, and on September

25

appOinted Taney Secretary

of the Treasury.3
The Senate was more irritated over this aotion than over the
original veto.

Due to the close relationship that had always

between Congress and the Treasury Department, they felt

~reva11ed

that their prerogat1ve was being threatened.
~ecretary,

~ongr.ss

The duties of the

they argued, were assigned by Congress, and it was to

that he was direoted to report.

In other words, Jackson

~hought

the Secretary was subject to the President's orders,

~hereas

the Senate did not. 4

When Congress assembled 1n December, 1833, Henry Clay proposed that an inquiry be made Jor the President, whether a. certain
~aper

reported to have been read at a cabinet meeting and later

3Sc hleslnger, ~ Age
4S1nkley, Powers

2!

2!

Jackson, 100-1.

~ President, 78.
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published was.genuine,

h •••

and ir genuine that he be also re-

quested to lay a copy or said paper before the Senate."

Some

objections were made by the Jacksonians, Benton and Forsyth, but
the measure was swlrtly passed. S
The paper in question was of course the one Jaokson read to
his cabinet on September 18, containing his decision to remoYe
government £Unds from the United States Bank, and listing his
reasons for this action.

The President claimed that the law gave

full authority to the Secretary, and that Congress' right to
knowledge was only supposed to be an aid to further legislation.
This power or the Secretary had been derended in 1817, he said,
and even though the charter had not yet expired, he felt that
the removal should be gradual and over a period of time.

Various

reasons were then advanced why the President thought the Bank was
against the public interest. 6
It is interesting to conjecture what might have been the
motives at Henry Clay_

Why, for instanoe, did he insist on

Jackson's handing over to the Senate a paper which had been published in thousands of newspapers allover the United States and
Europe?

This question also occurred to Senators Benton and

Forsyth, and the latter bluntly asked Clay from the Senate floor
what the object of the motion was, whether it was not for purposes
500n~essional Globe, 23rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1 $), 20-21.
6Messages and Papers £! ~ Presidents, III, 1224-38.
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of impeaching. the President?

It was one of the rare occasions

that found the great orator without an answer.

Binkley suggeata

that Clay was simply trying to play up the President·s part in
the removal as much as possible. 7 This would square with the
assertion of Marquis James that throughout the whole affair Clay
was really more concerned with his chances in the eleotion ot
18)6 than with the tate ot the Bank. 8
On December 12, the President addressed a toroetul reply to
the Senate's resolution.

The letter read in part:

The executive is a ooordinate and independent
branch of the Government equally with the Senate,
and I have yet to learn under what constitutional
authority that branch ot the Legislature has a right
to require ot .e an aooount ot any communioation, either
verbally or in writing, made to the heads ot Departments
acting as a Cabinet council. As well might I be required
to detail to the Senate the tree and priVate oonversations I have held with those offioers on any subject
relating to their duties and my own.

'*

..

*'

Knowing the constitutional rights ot the Senate,
I ahall be the last man under any oiroumstanoes to
intertere with them. Knowing those of the Exeoutive,
I shall at all times endeavor to maintain them agreeably to the provisions ot the Constitution and the
solemn oath I have taken to support and defend it. 9
The point at issue then took a false shitt.

"It is a

struggle," said Calhoun, "between the exeoutive and legislative

7B1nkley, Powers 2! ~ President, 80.
8Marqu1s James, The Life .ot Andrew Jackson, (New York.,
1938), 6S5.
9Melsages and Papers ~ ~ Presidents, III, 1255.
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departments ot the Government; a struggle, not in relation to
the existence of the Bank, but which, Congress or the President,
should have the power to create a bank, and the consequent control over the currency ot the country.
tion." 10

or

This is the real ques-

course this was not the real issue at all, but it

weB an issue on which allot Jackson's enemies could unite, the
Bank supporters as well as proponents of nullification.

The

Senate tloor and galleries were packed when, on December 26, Clay
Bounded the ke,-note.

"We are," he said, "in the midst of a

revolution rapidly tending toward a total change of the pure
republican character of our government, and to the concentration
of all power in the hands of one man.

The powers of Congress

ere paralyzed, except when exerted in conformity with his will,
by

frequent and extraordinary exercise of the executive veto,

not anticipated by the rounders of our Constitution and not
practiced by any predecessors of the present chier magistrate. fl
The speech, which lasted trom the twenty-sixth to the thirtieth
of December, ranged from suoh subjeots as the undermining of
the currency and the tariff to the grave dangers to liberty and
the Constitution embodied in the person of Andrew Jackson.

Clay

concluded: .t'1'he premonitory symptoms of despotism are upon us;
and it Congress do not apply an instantaneous and effective

lOaesister of Debates in the United States conareS8, 23rd
Congress, 1st seiBion, (WashIngton, !834), x, 217-1 •
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remedy, the

t~tal

collapse will Boon come on, and we shall die

- -ignobly die- - bas., mean, and abject slaves, the scorn and
contempt ot mankind; unpitied, unwept, and unmournedlLfl11
December 26, the day on whioh he began his. speech, also saw
Clay propose two resolutions, whioh atter debate, were passed
early

~he

following year.

The first one stated: "Resolved that

the reasons assigned by the Secretary for the removal are unIt was passed on February 5 by

satisfaotory and insurticient. tt

a vote or twenty-eight to eighteen.

The second was a resolution

censuring the President which stated: "Resolved, that the President in the late executive proceedings in relation to the public
revenue, has assumed upon himselt authority and power not contarred by the Constitution and the 1awa, but in derogation of
both."l2

This resolution was passed on March 28, by a vote of

twenty-s.llc to twenty.
On April

15

President Jackson countered with a lengthy pro-

test addressed to the Senate.

nThe President of the United

states, thererore, has been by

8

majority ot his constitutional

triers accused and tound guilty ot an impeachable ottense," said
Jackson, "but in no part of thls proceeding have the directions
ot the Conatitution been observed."

12John S.

Of course, it was no aecret

llIbid., 59-94.

1931),

649.

Baasett. The Life ot Andrew Jackson, (New York,

-
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tbat the

Hous~

was Jackson's and would never impeach him.

The

senat.'s action in censuring the President was second best to impeachment, and the only alternative open to the Senate which had
not the right to impeach the President, tor it remains to the
House to institute proceedings against the Ohief Executive, and
Jackson'. retaliation was merely to point out to the Senate the
unconstitutionalIty of its action. l )
The Senate refused to receive this reprimand of the President, and the censure resolution alone remained on the record.
This enabled the friends of the President to claim he had been
condemned without a hearing, and that his protest had been treated
with contempt. 14
Of course, the President never banded over the requested
paper.

With the House solidly behind him, there was not a chance

in the world he would be impeached, and so the worst the Senate
could do was to refUse to place his protest in the record.
Apr!l

4,

four resolutions proposed

by

aepresentative James K. Polk

were passed in the House, killing the Bank.
tar from being closed.

On

But the affair was

Senator Thoma.s Benton pledged that he would

not rest until the censure resolutIon was expunged trom the record,
and he began a campaign to secure that end.

13Messages ~ Papers

Pressure was exerted

2! !h! presidents, III, 1288-1312.
14Bassett, Andrew Jackson, 650.
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by the Presi<.\ent and his huge following upon state legislatures,
which then began to demand the resignatIon of senators who had
voted for the censure.

At last in 1831, with Jackson no longer

in offIce, the expunging resolution was passed.

Not even the

opposition of Henry Clay, making one of the great speeches ot
his career, could stop it.l5
Was Taney justified in

remo~ing

the deposita?

He himself

certainly thought so. since section sixteen of the Bank oharter
gave him full discretion to do as he saw fIt, and it would
that he was right.

8~em

He po1nted out that the congressional power

to orde:r restorat10n of the funds was invalid without the President's consent.

Then too, when the Secretary was g1ven power to

withdraw deposits by Oongress, that body was well aware that the
President had the power to remove the secretary.l6
But even if Jackson and Taney were not justified in removing
the funds from the Bank, the President was undoubtedly justified
in refusing his cabinet paper of September 18 to the Senate.
Such an inquiry on the part of
says Binkl&7.

8

Congressman today would be absur

The reason it did not strike them as such in those.

dars was because people had been accustomed to nearly twenty-five
yeers of subordination of the Executive to Congress. 17

Jackson's

/~:;\ s

To W0,
,--~,

/

l5B1nkley, Powers of !h! President, 85-88 V
l6S asse tt, Andrew Jackson, 646-9.
17Binkley, Powers· of the President, 80.

~~"

l OYOLA
UNIVt::RSITY

l../8RAR

~

\

34
victory is

im~ortant

precisely because it was the first time a

president's refusal had been tounded merely on the protection ot
the bxecutive's prerogative.

As such, there can be no doubt that

it was tor the public welfare, sinoe protection ot the principles

ot the Constitution is always tor the public welfare.

Conse-

quently, Jackson was tully within the conditions laid down by
washington tor the exerciae of the power.
Yet, this case was even more significant because it came at
a time when the power of Congress was at a peak, and beoause it
was, to a certain extent, a partisan conflict won by the President.

With one exception, the situation which surrounded

President Andrew Jackson in 1833 is unique in American history,
a8

far as the refusal of intormation is concerned.

That one ex-

ception provides the background tor our second Case.
A large amount of the credit tor the success ot Andrew
Jacksonts two administrations must be attributed to his use ot
the spoils system.

The Senate realized this tact, and during

Jackson's own time sought to share with the Fresident the power
he enjoyed.

But the old general was a bit too cratty as well as

stronger and more popular, and at length the Senate was torced to
desist.

For one reason or another the presidents following Jaok-

son were weaker, and senatorial encroachment onoe again continued
along the path it had been pursuing when he entered the White
House.

The olimax ca.me with the Tenure ot Otfice Act of 1867, by

35
which the Senate assumed control or all appointments to and removals trom public ortice.
president brought about

8

Public opinion and protests by the
revision in the act two years later,

which took most or the sting out ot the law.

Nevertheless, the

amendment failed to restore the President's full freedom ot removal, ror it provided that the Executive within thirty days atter
the commencement or each session nominate persons to till the
vacancies,

Then if the Senate rejected any of these apPointments,

the President had to make others, and so OD, until an agreement
was reached.

These limitations were tha

s~bject

ot numerous pro-

testa by Presidents Grant, HaJes. and Garfield, and the law waa
generally conaidered unconstitutional by most lawyers both in and
out of the Senate.
18
[books.

Yet nothing was done to remove it rrom the

When Grover Oleveland took the oath of ortice on March

4,

1885, his inaugural address lett no doubt ss to the new President.s "appr.ciation of thoae functions whioh by the Constitution
and laws have been especially assigned to the executive branch ot
the Government."19
~he

~and

In the interval between his inauguration and

opening of the first session ot Oongress in December, Cleve·
suspended 643 Republican ofticials end appointed the same

18Robert McElroy, Grover Cleveland, The Man and the states-

!!m., (New York, 1923), I, 169-172.
- - - 19Messages !B!! Papers 2! ~ Presidents, X, 1~886.
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number of

loy~l

Democrats to fill those vacancies.

By tar the

greater number of officials suspended, said the President, were
ousted because of "gross and indecent partisan conduct on the part
of the incumbents."

He had in mind the use of government post

oftices as local party headquarters, e.nd other scheming which went
on during the election. 20
When Congress convened in December, Cleveland, in accordance
with the Tenure of Office Act of 1869, submitted the names of his

643 Democratic appointees, well within the required thirty day
limit.

Immediately, congressional committees began bombarding

the President and executive departments with requests for reasons,
8S

well as papers and information on file in the executive depart-

ments relating to the

sU8p,~+nsions.

Said Cleveland in retrospec t:

"These requests foreshadowed what the Senatorial construction of
the law of 1869 might be, and indicated that the Senate, notwithstanding constitutional limitations, and even in the face ot the
repeal of statutory provisions giving it the right to pass upon
suspensions by the President, was still inclined to insist, direct
11 or indirectly, upon that right. n21

The RepublIcan Senate was

olearly making an attempt to preserve the power it had held for
years, despite the fall of the Presidenoy and the House to the
Democrats. 22
20Grover Cleveland, Presidential Problems, (New York, 1904),

39-42.

2l Ibid ., 46.
22Binkley, Powers of the President. 176.
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Realizin, that the doctrine of separation ot powers was at
stake, the President directed all department heads to refuse any
requests for information concerning the suspensions with the
stereotyped reply that nthe public interest would not thereby be
promoted," or that 11th. reasons related to purely administrative
acts. II

With regard to the 643 Cleveland appointees to ortice,

the .President later said that Itall information of any description
1n the possession of the Executive or in any of the departments,
which would aid in determining the character and fitness of those
nominated in place of suspended offiCials, was cheerfully and
promptly furnished to the Senate or its committees when

requeste~

However, he felt that it he complied with senatorial requests for
information concerning the suspensions, he would be failing in his
duty to defend and protect the Constitution and the office ot
President. 2 .3
The reaction of the Senate was to delay.

It was intimated

that the Senate would confirm Cleveland's nominations if he would
merely withdraw his accusations against the suspended otticials.
Such a course would have been politically unwise in the long run,
as well as dishonest, and realizing this, the President refused
even to consider it.

And

80

after a lapse of three months, only

seventeen ot the 643 nominations had been considered, and only
fifteen confirmed.

Cleveland himself was by this time convinced

23Cleveland, Presidential Problems, 46-8.
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that the Senate was a.ttempting to lay a t'oundation for the contention that it had a right to control the heads ot executive
departments even against the President in matters ot' executive
duty.24
When it became clear that the strategy of holding up appoint
mente would not force the President into acknowledging their
right to control removals, the senatorial majority chose another
epproach.

On July 17, 1885, Cleveland had removed George M.

Duskin t'rom the post of District Attorney for Southern Alabama,
and had replaced him with a Democrat, John D. Burnett.

On

December 20. the Senate Judiciary Committee requested all papers
and information relating to the nomination of Burnett and to the
removal of Duskin.

The Attorney-General replied by granting the

first request which pertained to the appointment of Burnett, for
there was no doubt that the Senate had a share in tha.t power.
However, concerning the Duskin papers. he replied that he had not
yet received any orders from the President directing their
transmission. 25 Within a t'ew hours of this refusal. the Judiciar
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Committee held a discussion of the question.
to the President of this meeting:

24~ ••

49-50

------ -- ---

25Binkley, Powers of the President, 177.
--~~--~

Senator Vest wrote
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Mr •. Edmunds replied that he did not claim the
right to know the Fresident's reasons for suspension,
but that committees of Congress had never been refused
such courtesy by the President, etc. No one of the
Republican senators present dissented trom this position.
Mr. Edmunds clearly conceded the point, that the President had the exclusive Constitutional power to make
removals and suspensions, for reaso~g satisfactory to
him, without consulting the Senate.
Despite this opinion the Republican majority was as determined as ever to force the President to yield to their demand.
On January 25, 1886, contrary to the best legal opinion, a
resolution Was passed whioh stated: "Resolved that the Attorney
General be, and he hereby is direoted to transmit to the Senate
copies ot all documents and papers tha.t have been tiled in the
department of justice since the firet day of January, A.D. 1885,
in relation to the conduct of the Office ot District Attorney of
the United States for the Southern Distriot ot Alabama."21

With

the resolution went a defiant ultimatum that the Senate would
never confirm persons nominated to sucoeed suspended otficials
unless the reasons tor the suspensions were furnished.
the Attorney General:

ftI

Replied

am direoted by the President to refuse

your demand ... 28
At this point the olash broke wide open.

The Senate passed

another resolution, this time condemning "the refusal of the
Attorney General under whatever inrluence, to send to the Senate

-

l

26McElroy, Grover Oleveland, 116.
27Cleveland, Presidential Problems, 52.
28McElroy, Grover Cleveland, I, 177.
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copies of the,papers called for in its resolution of the twentyfifth ot January • • • as in violation of his official duty and
subversive of the principles of Government and good administration thereof."

They declared it was the duty of the Senate to

"refuse its advice and consent to the proposed removals of
officers when such papers are denied."29
Cleveland then drafted a message which he sent to the Sena.te
on March 1, and in which he assumed full responsibility for the
Attorney General's refusal.

"I do not suppose," he said, denying

that Congress had any control over executive departments, "that
'the public offices of the United States' are regulated or controlled in their relations to either House ot Oongress by the
fact that they were 'created by laws enacted by themselves.

til

As for the papers, to which the Senate claimed it had a right
because they were of an offiCial nature, the President said:
They consist of letters and representations addressed
to the Executive or intended for his inspection; they
are voluntarily written and presented by private citizens
who are not in the least instlga.ted thereto by any
ofticial invitation or at all subject to otticial control.
While some of them are entitled to Executive consideration, many ot them are so irrelevant, or in the light of
other facts so worthless, that they have not been given
the least weight in determining the question to which
they are supposed to relate.
Cleveland continued, asking whether these papers were to be oonlidered public and offioial simply because they were kept in the

29Cleveland, Presidential Problema,

51.
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Executive

Man~ion

or deposited in the Departments.

"If the

presence of these papers in the public offices is a stumblingblock," said the President ooyly, "in the way of the performance
of Senatorial duty, it can easily be remedied."

He then went on

to discuss the Tenure of Office Act, and accused the Senate of
trying to handcuft him as it had Andrew Johnson twenty years
earlier, and he bluntly declared both the repealed and unrepealed
parts of that act to be unconstitutional. 30
Upon receiving the President's message, the chairman of the
Judiciary Committee said he thought it was the first

~.Jme

in the

nation's history that a Fresident had interfered with the deliberations of either house of Congress.

Debate on the two reports

of the comm1ttee and on the Presidentta message continued tor
two weeks.

At last the Senate passed a resolution censuring the

Attorney General, and by implication the President, by

8

vote of

thirty-two to twenty-five.)l
The climax of the whole affa.ir was reached when Cieveland
delivered a death blow, revealing tha.t Duskin's term had expired
on Deoember 20, 188"

prior to the demand for papers relating to

his office, and prior to the resolutions and reports of the
Judiciary Committee and to the debate defending this supposedly

-

30Messases ~ Papers
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suspended

off~cial.

This took all the sting out of the Senate's

"professed anxiety • • • to guard the interests of an official who
was suspended from office in July, 1885, and who was still claimed
'cO

be in a state of suspension."32

The only question remaining

was the confirmation of Burnettts appointment, and as there was
no reason for displs.cing him, it was quickly made.

"0nce again, tI

says Binkley, "just as in the impeachment of Johnson, there had
been selected an impossible case on which to test their powers
over dismissal.

Their experience with the Tenure of Office Acts

was altogether unlucky."33
Of course, the big viotory came when in December, 1886,
Senator Hoar, one of the Republicans who had opposed Cleveland,
introduced in the Senate a measure repealing the Tenure of Office
Act.

The bill was passed with only one Republican dissenting. 34

Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for the Republican

.

about~tace

was

their realization of what the Whigs in Jacksonts time had never
been able to grasp, that the American people s,)emed to regard the
President more or less as a tribune, and tended to identity themselves with the President 1n·his fight against the Legislative
Branch of the Government. 35

Indicative of this mood of the people

321.!?!!!., 68
33Binkley, Powers

.2!. s.h!. .President, 181.

34George F. Hoar, Autobiography, (New York, 1903), II, 143-4.
35Binkley, Powers 2£

!h! President, 182.

was the March.ll, 1886 editorial in the Nation which read:

"there

is not the smallest reason for believing that, it the Senate won,
it would use its victory in any way tor the Maintenance or promotion of reform.

In truth, in the very midst of the controversy,

it confirmed the nomination of one of Baltimore's political
Bcamps.n36

In addition to public opinion there were certain other

factors which influenced the Senatets capitulation.

The Presi-

dent's strong and irrefUtable message, the revelation about

Duski~

the fact that many Republicans sincerely felt the President was
right, all these contributed to the change in the position of the
Senatorial majority.

Then too, many RepubliCans had apprOached

the President with requests to depose members of their own party
from office, end they now feared that the President might make
this publiC, as well a8 the evidence supplied by them. 37
This was one of Grover Cleveland's greatest constitutional
victories.

Rarely since the days of Andrew Jackson had a pres-

ident stood up to the Senate so fearlessly and successfully.

In-

deed, there are a number of similarities between this case and
Jacksonts war against the Bank in 1833-34.

Both involved con-

tlicts between a DemocratiC President and an opposition Senate;
~oth

occurred after a long period of Senatorial dominance in the
36Henry J. Ford, ~ Cleveland Era, (New Haven, 1921), 74.

~.

~oPk.

37A11an Nevins, Grover Cleveland, ! study

1932), 263.

!rr

Courage, (New
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government; bo.th resulted in victories for the Chief Executive,
and in the restoration of a certain measure of Presidential power.
Was Cleveland justified in withholding the information relating to the suspensions?
on this soore.

There seems to be no doubt whatever

In the first place, as the minority report men-

tioned, all the precedents cited by the majority of the Judiciary
Committee, in which the President had handed over information to
congress, involved business over which Congress had some power
according to the Constitution, for example, treaty-making and
appointment.

Yet in this case, the Tenure of Offioe revision ot

1869 clearly and completely reserved all power over removals and
suspensions to the discretion ot the President alone.

Thus

Cleveland could hardly have surrendered the requested information
and files without ettectually admitting that the Senate had a
share in the removal power, which they most definitely did not
have.

Refusal of the information was essential to protect the
powers of the President against Senatorial encroachment. 38
In the second place, a pledge of secrecy had been given to
the numerous advisors who had donated information.

li"ailure to

keep such a pledge would eventually have caused the desertion ot
all the President's advisors, and greatly handicapped him in the
administration of the government. 39

-y

As both these motives for

38Ernest J. Eberling, Con~e88ional Investigations, (New
ork, 1928). 258.
39Nevins, Grover Cleveland, 260 •
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refusal were v.ery muoh for the publio welfare, and

tiS

oomplianoe

would have been oontrary to the public welfare, Cleveland was
fully Justified in his use of the power, for he followed strictly
the preoedent set down by President George Washington.
The two oases just oonsidered were undoubtedly the most important instanoes of a presidential refusal of information for
the purpose of proteoting the prerogative of the Chief Executive.
There were, however, three other oases of lesser importance, in
which the same reason for withholding information was advanoed,
but in whioh the President's right was less vehemently oontested.
President Andrew Jaokson, who so successfully asserted the
oonstitutional power ot the Executive in the oonflict with the
Senate

alr~ady

considered, later found two more opportunities to

assert this p.ower, one in 1835, and the other in 1831.

His vic-

tory in 1834 must have thrown a pall over the other cases, at
least so tar as Congress was oonoerned, for in comparison with
that earlier C88e the later ones were quite tame.

The seoond

Jackson oase was preoipitated when an offiaial by the name of
Gideon Fitz, who held the otfice of Surveyor-General South of the
.tate of Tennes8ee, was removed from his poat by the President.
On February 2, 1935, the Senate passed a resolution in whioh it
requested the President to hand over oopies of the oharges whioh
were communioated to Jaokson against F1tz, and which were reaponsible for Fitzts removal from office.

The reasons given tor

the request were that this information was neGesesar,. in order that

-...
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the Senate might know how to act concerning the appointment of a
successor to Fitz, and as an aid to the investiga.tion it was then
conducting into certain alleged frauds in the sale of public
lands. 40
The President replied on February 10, explaining that although in the past he had frequently handed over information, in
this Case he felt compelled to refuse.

He considered that he

would be failing in his duty of resisting encroachment on the
rights of the Executive, since the in.formation in question was
not of a more general type, but related exclusively to subjects
falling under the jurisdiction of the Executive alone.

Jackson

also pOinted out that compliance with the resolution would ver'Y
likely result in a Senate review of his removal ot Pitz, a right
possessed by that body only when sitting as judges in a case of
impeachment.

And even it such a consequence did not result in

this case, JaCkson still felt that compliance with this request
might later be cited aa a precedent for later applications of a
similar nature.

The President concluded:

I therefore decline a compliance with 80 much of
the resolution of the Senate as requests tcopie. of the
charges if any,' in relation to Mr. Fitz, and in doing
10 must be distinctly understood a8 neither affirming nor
denying that any such oharges were made; but as the Senate may lawfully call upon the President for information
properly appertaining to nominations submitted to them,
I have the honor, in this respeot, to reply that ! have
none to giye them in the oase or the perlon nominated

47
to Mr. Fitz, except that I believe him,
from sources entitled to the highest credit, to be
well qualified in abilities and charapier to discharge
the duties of the office in question. 4
88 succe~sor

An appropriate close to the administration of Andrew Jackson
came with one of the most successful attempts of
resist a Congressional inquiry.

8

President to

On January 17, 1837, a special

committee of the House was appointed to conduct an examination
into the condition of certain executive departments.

To aid the

committee a series of resolutions was adopted on January 23, calling on the President and heads ot departments tor certain information.

Especially outstanding was the following:
Resolved that the President ot the United states be requested and the heads of the several departments be
directed to furnish this committee with a list, or lists,
ot all officers or agents or deputies, who have been
appointed or employed and paid since 4th of March 1829,
to the first of December last (it any without authority
of law) or whose names are not contained in the last
printed register of public offices commonly called the
Blue Boot by the President or either ot the said Heads
of Depts. respectively; and without nomination to, or
the advice and consent of the Senate ot the United states
showing the names of such officers or agents or deputies;
the SUMS paid each, the services rendered and by wha.t
authority appointed and paid; and what reasons for such
apPointments.42
A copy of these resolutions was sent to President Jaokson

by

the committee.

On January 27 Jaokson's reply was delivered

by

his secretary to Mr. Henry Wise of Virginia, Chairman of the

41~., III, 1351-53.
42Register ot Debates in the United states Congress, 24th
Congress, 2nd Session, (Wash1ngton, 18j7), XIII, APpendix, 199.
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committee.

The message pointed out that the resolutions adopted

by the House implied that there was reason to doubt the statement
in his annual message that the executive departments were in good
condition.

or

The letter i8 such an excellent and forceful defense

Presidential prerogative that it merits quotation at least in

part.

Said Jackson:
• • • according to the established rules of lew, you rerequest my self and the heads of departments to become
our own accusers, and to furnish the evidence to convict
ourselves; and this call purports to be founded on the
authority of that body, in which alone by the Constitution,
the power of impeachment is vested. The heeds of departments
may anewer such requests as they please, provided they do
not withdraw their own time and that of the officers under
their direction, from the public business to the injury
thereof • • • For myself, I shall repel all such attempts
as an invasion of the prinCiples ot Justice, as well as
of the Constitution; and I shall esteem it my sacred duty
to the people of the United states to resist them as I
would the establishment ot a Spanish Inquisition.43
Chairman Wise was quite overwrought a.t this reply, and on

January 30, he rose to otter a series of resolutions to the oommittee.

The President's letter, he said, was "an otficial attack

on the proceedings of the House end of the committee."

He then

suggested thet the oommittee listen to a report by himselt on the
correspondence exchanged with the President, and that measures be
considered for the detense of the Housets proceedings and powers
as well as those of its oommittees.

However, the vote of the com-

mittee was negative, defeating Wise's resolutions six to three. 44

l

1.!-4Eberllng,
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It was the view ot the majority of the committee members
that the House did not have the power to call upon a party, much
less upon the President of the United states, to incriminate
itself.

There were two reasons which justified an investigation,

impeachment or legislation.

Legislation they argued had to be

ruled out as a motive, since the only defect that had been found
in the laws was in their execution.

Conaequently, they had no

other choice but to oonsider this request as

8.

preliminary in-

quiry ior the purpose of determining whether impeachment proceedings should be instituted or not.

In such a case they felt

that they could by no means construe their right to information
as an unlimited power to call for persons or papers at their own
arbitrary will.

Such action would be a violation of that pro-

vision of the Constitution which states that the people have

8.

right to security as to their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search or seizure.

The committee,

therefore, decided that they did not have the right to demand all
personal and private papers of public orficiala, and they concluded that

80

far as this partiCUlar investigation was ooncerned

there was no evidence that the executive departments had not been
conducted with ability and integrity.45
And so the matter was settled.

Mr. Wise was quite dis-

satisfied with the committee's verdict, and claimed that there

4.5Ibld., 137-8.
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was a

ditfere~c.

between an inquisition, which was what Jackson

termed the House's request, and an inquiry, which he thought the
committee had a right and a duty to make. 46
or may not have been valid.

This distinction may

Nevertheless, Wise did overlook one

very important tact which in subsequent cases was brought out
explicitly, and that is that the right of the House or the Senate
to make inquiries, whioh no one would dispute, does not presuppose a oorresponding duty on the part of the President to
comply with suoh inquiries.

This was the first time the prinoi-

ple established by Washington in 1192, that oomplete discretion
rests with the fresident, was attaoked.

Jackson's victory on the

point was final and oonclusive.
A factor which should not be passed over, although it is ot
minor importance, is that, as Wise pOinted out, Jackson controlled the House. and, therefore, the committee too.

This was

indicated by the hasty and superfioial vind1cation they gave the
President.
hide.

Possibly the administration had a tew skeletons to

There can be no doubt that Jackson would have had a much

harder fight against a House dominated by the opposition, and it
there had been anything to hide, and were it serious enough, the
President might have been hard pressed to avoid impeachment proceedings.

This illustrates the intluence that party politics can

have on the use and development of a power suoh as this.

Of

$1

course, as the Cas. stands today, whether there were any skeletons or not, we do not know, nor was it ever proved.

And

Jacksonta assertion of his right not to teatify agaInst himselt
certainly was valid, and very much in conformity with the publio
interest.
A rather amusing case occurred in 1876 when on April 3. the
House requested President Ulysses S. Grant to inform it whether
any executive offices, acts, or duties were within a certain
period performed away trom tbe capital.

It would seem that the

8im ot this inquiry oould only have been to oause the President
some embarrassment tor his lengthy summer sojourns at the Jersey
Shore.

Replied the President: ttl fail • • • to .find in the

Constitution of the United states the authority given to the
House of Representatives to requlre of the Exeoutive, an independent branch ot the Government, coordinate with the Senate and
House of Representatives, an aocount of his disoharge of his
appropriate and purely executive offices, acts, and dutles. 61the
88

to when, where, or how performed. "47
Grant a180 went on to say that as the inf'ormat'l ("

requested

could have little to do with legislation, tho only other purpose
could be in view of the Houae's power ot impeaohment.

However,

he reminded the House that no one can be t"orced to testify agains
himself, not even the President.

-

The act upon which the request

47Meaaases !.!!S! rapers 2!. ~ Presidents, lX, b316
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was based, he. said, related only to the establishment of the seat

at govermrlent, and the provision 01" buildings and ortioes.

Grant

conoluded by enclosing a long list or precedents justirying his
behavior.

The preoedents inoluded numerous oases trom the ad-

ministrations of nearly all of his predecessors in whioh the
fresident had oarried on exeout1ve bus1ness away rrom the seat
of government. 48

Hia letter left little doubt either of the

correotness of his refusal or of his long-established praotioe ot
maintaining a

t'

sUllIIlJer Whl te Bouse. Jt

481bld., IX, 4317-18.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE rOWER - I I

Besides the 08ses already mentioned in whioh the f:resident's
refusal ot into:rmation was prompted by the neoessity ot defending
the prerogative of the Executive against encroaohrrlent, there were
elso many cases in which oertain more speoifie issues were at
stake.

For instanoe, one of the reasons most rreQuently resorted

to in recent

tl~.

has been the President's feeling of obligation

toward the individual, or toward the private citizen, or toward
persons whose constitutional right ot a public t:rial ot jury
seemed in danger of violation.

In this conneotion, the following

four cases provide excellent preoedents for the act10ns of modern
Chief Exeoutive ••
Late in 1806, the nation val deeply conoerned over the Burr
Conspiracy, and Jerferson's seeming laxity in handling the affair.
The President ment10ned the subject in his annual message to Congress in December, 1806, but his fa1lure to mention any names
Caused Congressman John Randolph to intDoduce the following resolution into the House of Representatlves on January 16:
Resolved, that the President of the United states be,
and he hereby is, requested to lay before this House
any information 1n poss8ssion of the Executive, except
such as he may deem the public weltare to require not
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to be di_closed, touching any illegal combination ot
private individuals against the peaoe and satety of the
Union, or any military expedition planned by suoh individuals against the territories of any Fower in amity
with the United states; together with the meS.8ures whioh
the Executive haa pursued and proPfses to take for
suppressing or deteating the S8me.
The resolution was overwhelmingly passed.
AccordinglY', on January 22, the President replied in a messsge to the Senate and the Hou.e, 8ull'.llIlarizlng the detalls of the
oonspiraoy as related to him by dispatohes trom General Wilkinson
and other souroe..

However, he retused to give any names other

than that of Aaron Burr.

Said the President:

The mass ot what I have reoeived in the oourse ot the ••
transaotions 18 voluminous, but little haa been given
under the sanction ot an oath so a8 to constitute formal
and legal evidenoe. It is ohietly in the torm ot letters,
otten oontainlng such a mixture of rumors, oonJectures,
and suspicions 8S renders it diffioult to sift out the
real taots and unadvi.able to hazard more than general
outlines, strengthened by oonourrent information or the
partloular oredibility or the relator. In thi. state
of the ev1dence, delivered 8ometime., too, under the
re8tl'iction ot private oonfidence, neither aatetr nor
justIce will permit the exposing names, except that of
the pr1nc~pal actor, who.e guilt ia placed beyond
question.
Of Jefrerson's rerusal to give names, Schaahner blandly
states:

uHis delio8.cy was doubtless motivated by the considera-

tion that had he ylelded all the names, '·hey would have inoluded
such men

-

a8

lAnnals

Senators Breckinrldge and Smith, General Andrew
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Jackson and Go.vernor William Henry Harrison, as well as Wilkinson
himself, with explosive personal and political connotations.")
It is not too difficult to understand how such notable personages
e8

these might have been involved, tor Jefferson mentions,4 and

Schachner admits,S that Burr managed to seduce many well meaning
citizens into believing he had the support of the Government in
bls mysteloicU3 enterprise.

Nor would it be too surprising it

Jefferson wished to keep this information secret.

Yet, Schachner

seems to imply that this was his only reason for withholding the
nemes.

Such a charge, the truth ot which is by no means selt-

evident, seems to call for more proof than Schachner gives, and
until such proof is forthcoming, it seems reasonable to accept
Jefferson's own explanation of his refusal at its face value.
A similar case ocourred during the administration of President James Monroe, although the issue did not conoern the value
of the evidence involved.

On January 4, 1825, the House of

Representatives passed a resolution requesting President Monroe
to hand over a number ot documents relating to the conduot of
certain American naval officers serving in the Pacific, and of
ertain government agents in South America. 6

Some of the charges

3Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, (New York, 1951), II, 8
4Messages
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5Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 8)1.
6con ,res8ional Record, 69th Congress, 1st Session, (Washing-
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made against the principal naval officer, one Commodore stewart,
were sent to Washington by the American ambassador to

Mr. frevost.

~eru,

a

The ambassador was in turn the subject of accusationl

made by others in South America.

Monroe suspended the Commodore

from duty pendIng the trial and summoned him, together with Mr.
Prevost, to Washington for a showdown. 7

What the documents re-

quested by the House contained is not clear.

On January 10, the

President answered the request as tollows:
In this stage the publication of those documents
might tend to excite prejudices which might operate to
the injury ot both • • • • It is due to their [the accused]
rights and to the character of the Government that they
be not censured without Just cause, which cannot be ascertained until, on a view ot the charges, they are heard
in their detens., and arter a thorough and impartial investigation ot their conduct. Under these circumstances
it is thought that a communication at this time ot those
documents would not comport with the publi~ interest nor
with what is due to the parties concerned.
fresident Andrew Jackson's refusal in 1835 to communicate
the

charges made ags.inst the otticial conduct of Gideon Pi tz,

one-time Surveyor-General of Tennessee, has already been treated
at length.

The case deserves mention again at this point, for

beSides his fears at Senatorial encroachment on the powers at the
ax.cutiv., Jackson also cited as a reason tor refusing the intor..tion the tact that

fl • • •

the

citi~en

whose conduct is impeached

7Messasea ~ Papers
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[Mr.

Fita] would lose one of his valuable securitIes, that whIch

is afforded by a public investigation 1n the presence ot hi.
accusera and of the wItnesses against hlm.n9
A Oase very a1milar to the one whIch occurred durIng JefferOn May 18,

son'a admInIstration took place under President Tyler.

1842, the House requested-trom the Seoretary ot War cop1es

or

certa1n reports made to the War Department, which dealt with the
affairs or the Cherokee Indians, and with oertain injustices whioh
had been perpetrated against them, together with all the tact. in
possession ot the Executive relating to the SUbject.

After con-

sultation with the fre.ident, the Seoretary at War informed the
House that linoe negotiations tor the settlement ot IndIan claims
were at that time well under way, it was the opinion ot the 1>re8·
i

Ident and the War DepartR8nt that pub11cation ot the report would
b. lnconsiatent with the publio interest.

FUrthermore, sa1d the

Secretary, the report oonta1ned information of questionable value,
obtained without the sanct10n ot an oath, and which the persons
1ap11oated had had no opportunity to deny or explain.

Promulga-

t10n ot suoh informatIon would, thererore, be a gros8 injustice to

tbe persons involved, espeCially aince the Department had not yet

an opportunity ot calling upon the interested parties tor

9Mels!ies ~ Papers
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This answer was not satisfactory to the House Committee on
Indian Affairs, which felt that it had a right to any information
dealing with subjeots of House deliberation. 10 Accordingly, on
January 31, President Tyler himself replied in a lengthy letter
to the House.

He agreed to surrender much of the information re-

quested and previously refused, since negotiations were by that
time completed.

However, he flatly denied that the President was

obliged to give information to the House simply because it concerned a subject of House deliberation.

Moreover, concerning the

persons involved, Tyler again withheld all information, since h.
felt it would be an injustice to them to release it.
Another reason for his refusal which had not been fully
developed in the earlier letter was also treated here.

This con-

cerned the President's obligation to the Army officer who had made
the report, one Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcook.

Said Tyler:

The officer charged with a confidential inquiry, and
who reports its result under the pledge of confidence
which his aPPOintment implies, ought not to be exposed
individually to the resentment of those whose conduct
may be impugned by the information he oollects. The
knowledge that such is to be the consequence will inevi tabl,. prevent the pertormance of duties of" tbs.t
character, and thus the Government will be deprived
of an imporrfnt means of investigating the conduct of
its agents.
All four of these cases contain refusals of information
prompted by the President's duty to respect the rights of the
lOCongresslonal Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 6265.
llMessases ~ Papers

£! ~

Presidents, V, 2076.
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individual.

~e

cases arising under Presidents Jerrerson and

Tyler are remarkably similar because the emphasis is plaoed on the
questionable character or the inrormation which might be used as
evidenoe against some individual.

In the Cases under Monroe and

Jackson, it is more a question or proteoting the oitizents oonstitutional right to a publio trial by jury, in the presenoe of
witnesses.

It is not diffioult to see why the reasons alleged in

all tour ot' these cases might easily be construed as

8

proteotion

of the public interest, since any proteotion or constitutional
rights is to the advantage of the public.

The precedents set in

these four cases have undoubtedly been the most frequently used in
recent times, as will later be shown.
In three instances presidents have been known to refuse information on the grounds that it was "confidential."

The first

of these cases occurred toward the end of President Theodore
Roosevelt's second administration.

In 1907, the United States

Steel CorporatIon purohased the most important iron and steel
conoern in the South, the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company.

This

famous transaction, which supposedly alleviated the Panic of 1907,
Was made possible by the President's statement that he did not see

fit to "lnterpose any objections."
Senate

EI

A resolution was passed in the

ysar or so later directing the Senate Judiciary Committee

to determine and report as to whether the Presidentts action constituted a violation or the Sherman Anti Trust Law.

h

To aid the
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committee's e.tforts, anothett resolution was passed directing the
Attorney Genettal to turnish the committee with answers to the
following two questions:

1. Whether legal proceedings were in-

stituted against the United states Steel Corporation tor its
absorption ot Tennessee Ooal and Iron Company in 1907, and it not,
why not?

2. Whether an opinion was rendered concerning the legal-

ity of such absorption, and it so, what was it?12
The request of the Senate was referred to the ITesident and

on January 6, 1909, Mr. Roosevelt replied as tollows:
Atter sending this letter [to the Attorney General, November 4, 1907, advising him ot his action] 1 was advised
orally by the Attottney General that, in his opinion, no
suffIcient gttounds existed for legal proceedings against
the Steel Corporation, and that the situation had been
in no way changed by its acquisition of the Tennessee
Coal and Itton Company.
I have thus given to the Senate all the inrormation
in the posses81on of the Exeoutive Department whioh
appears to me to be material or relevant, on the subjec~
or the resolution. I teel bound, however, to add that I
have instructed the Attorney General not to respond to
that port10n ot tbe resolution which calls tor a statement or his reasona for nonaotion. I have done 80
because I do not oonceive it to be within the authottity
of the Senate to give directions ot this charaoter to
the head ot an execut1ve department, or to demand from
hIm reasons tor his aotion. Heads ot exeoutive departments are subject to the ConstitutIon and to the lawa
passed by the Congress in pUttsuance of the Oonstitution,
and to the direct10ns ot the President of t~. United
states, but to no other direction whatever. J

12consre.llonal Record, 60th Congress, 2nd Se8sion, 527-8.
13Ibld.
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When the .Senate found that it could not obtain the desired
papers from the Attorney General, it summoned Herbert Knox Smith,
head of the Bureau of Corporations, and ordered him to hand over
all the papers he had in his office on the subject.

Smith went to

the President and explained that most of the papers in question
had been secured in a confidential manner, and that grave trouble
would certainly result from their publication.

Roosevelt told

Smith to secure a decision from the Attorney General·s office that
the papers should not be made public, but the Senate Committee
retaliated by threatening Smith with imprisonment for contempt it
he did not transmit the papers at once.

nAs soon as he reported

this to me," said Roosevelt, ttl ordered him In writing to turn
over to me all the papers in the case, 80 that I could assist the
Senate in the prosecution of its Investigatlon. tl1 4
Roosevelt immediately saw Senator Clark, Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, and informing him of this action,

"[1]

told

him," he said, "they would not be given to the Senate, that I
could not be forced to give them, and I did not see why they shoul
make any effort to get them unleS8 they were prepared to go to the
length of trying to have me impeached.

This called tor a show-

down and I rather doubt it they will press their point, altho they
a.re so foolish that I am not certain on the subject. ltlS
14Th. Letters of Archie Butt, ad. Lawrence F. Abbott,
(Gardenl[fty, 1924);-No. 75, ~
lSThe Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Elting E. Morison,
(Cambridge, Mass., ~5~), No. 5131, 148i.
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Clark

th~n

assured the President that the Senate was merely

anxious to protect its own prerogative, and that the Committee
was most willing to submit to his point or view, if he felt the
papers should not be made public.

Roosevelt nonetheless re-

mained wary and oontinued to hold the papers beoause, as he put
it:

"Some of these faots which they want, for what purpose 1

hardly know, were given to the Government under the seal or
seoreoy and oannot be divulged, and 1 will see to it that the word
of this Government to the individual is kept sacred."16
As to the legality or Roosevelt's dealings with the United
states Steel Corporation, the Senate subcommittee could arrive
at no agreement.

While the opposition felt he had no authority

to permit the absorption of the Tennessee Company, Republicans
in the committee and in Congress simply maintained that the question was irrelevant, since Roosevelt did not authorize the transaotion, but merely said that he would not "interpose any
objeotion •• nI7
Years later, the Stanley Committee of the House undertook
another investigation of this famous business deal, but efforts
towards a detinite oonolusion were no more suooessful.

During

the hearings, oompetent witnesses under oath flatly contradioted
one another, and were themselves oontradioted by subsequent

----17Letters 2! Theodore Roosevelt,
16Letters or Archie Butt, 306.
------~

1481.

63
witnesses.

Th~

worst that could be agreed upon, and that only by

a majority of the committee, was that certain tacts had been misrepresented to the President by the representatives of the steel
Corporation, and that the President had acted "hastily and unwisely. "18
NOW, when a President retuses information to a subcommittee,
which 1s seek1ng to determine whether he acted legally or not 1n
a part1cular instance, certain suspicions might naturally be

aroused.

SUch a refusal might, ot course, be an outright abuse ot

the power to withhold intormation, since in that Case the Fresident would not be protecting the public interest but rather his
own personal interest, and that 1n a fraudulent manner.

Moreover,

there are not lacking those who feel that the old Roughrider was
capable ot just such an abuse, and who would not hesitate to argue
~

priori that Roosevelt must have been guilty.

This, of course,

remains to be proved, and in the opinion of students of the subject never will be proved conclusively, due to the confusion ot
the testimony given. l9

The whole tone of his correspondence on

the subject, both public and priVate, at least shows us that if
Roosevelt had anything to hide, that is, if he was in any way
guilty of illegal action, he certainly was not aware of it.

l8Henry R. Seager and Charles Gulick, Jr., Trust ~
Corporation Problems, (New York, 1929), 230-235.
19i1l!!., 235.
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And since it

~annot

be proved that his action was culpable, the

reason he actually gave for refusing the information, namely to
protect the sacred word of the United states Government to the
individual, ougbt to be accepted as Roosevelt's real and sincere
reason for the refusal.
Another case of the refusal of confidential information took
place when a special Senate investigating

co~ttee

was appointed

on March 12, 1924, to look into the proceedings of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.

A request was made of the Secretary ot the

Treasury tor a list of the companies whose tax returns he was
alleged to be investigating.~"0
President Coolidge considered the Senate's action to be an
unwarranted intrusion into the proceedinga ot the Executive Department.

He said:

"Whatever may be necessary for the informa-

tion of, the Senate or any of its oommittees in order to better
enable them to perform their legislative or other constitutional
functions ought alwaya to be furnished willingly and expeditiously
by any department.

But it ia recognized both by law and custom

that there is certain oonfidential information which it would be
detrimental to the public service to reveal. tt21

A similar Case oocurred in 1932 when the House requested all
documents pertaining to a Treasury Department investigation of the
20Ernest J. Eberling, Congressional Investigations, (New
York, 1928), 277.
21Congressional Record, 68th Congress, 1st Session, 6087.
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importation

~f

ammonium sulphate.

The request was refused by

secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills who said:

"It has been the

practice of the Department in acting under this statute to treat
all information turnished by interested persons as confidential
and not to disclose it unless such persons consent to the disclo.ure • • • • As consent has not been given to the disclosure
of the information contained in the record before the Treasury
Department, I am of the opinion that it would be incompatible
with the public interest to comply with the request contained in
the resolution. n22

~he letter was received by the Houae without

comment.
The only wartime exeroise of the power came at the outset of
the Civil War, when the Senate on March 25, 1861, requested President Lincoln to transmit oertain dispatches sent to the War Department by Major Robert Anderson, commanding officer at Fort
Sumter.

The dispatches contained such top secret information as

the detail's food supply and the position and strength of enemy
forces as well as of the Union torces. 23
On the following d87, the President replied that he had examined the oorrespondence, and concluded his letter by saying
that he had, "with the highest respect for the senate, come to

22...........
Ibid ., 72nd Congress, 1st Session, 11669 •
23Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln, the War Years, (New York,
1940), I, 188.
--- ---
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the

conclusio~

that at the present moment the publication or it

would be inexpedient.,,24
In 1930, for the

~irst

time since Washington's use of the

power in 1796, information was withheld concerning the negotiations of a treaty.

When the London Naval Treaty was submitted

to the Senate for ratification early in July; 1930, the Committee
on Foreign Relations requested from Secretary of state Stimson all
papers concerned with the negotiations prior to and during the
London Conrerence.

Some of these documents were handed over, but

the Secretary explained that he had been directed by the President
to refuse certain others, the disclosure of which would not be
compatible with the public interest.

The Foreign Relations Com-

mittee was indignant at this treatment, and pressed its right to
have tree and full acceS8 to the papers.

A resolution was adopted

which asserted tha.t the documents were fire levant and pertinent
when the Senate is considering a treaty for the purpose ot
ratiticatlon."25
This resolution prompted Stimson to write a short note to the
Senate, simply restating hlapp;evlous stand.

Congress adjourned

early in July, 1930, but President Hoover Immediately ca.lled back
the Senate to consider the treaty.

After three days of the spe-

cial sesslon, a resolution was passed by a vote ot fifty-three to
24Message. ~ Papers

£! ~

Presidents, VII, 3213.

25Congreaslonal Record, 71at Congress, 2nd Sesslon, 12030.
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four,

request~ng

the President to submit to the Senate all the

documents relating to the treaty, if not incompatible with the
public interest, together with whatever recommendations he might
see fit concerning their use. 26
The President replied on the following day, pointing out that
the number of informal reports and statements given to the Government in confidence was very great.

The President, he said, had an

obligation to keep secret all the negotiations of a treaty, according to the time-honored custom among nations, in order to preserve
friendly relations with other countries.

Hoover was sure that the

Senate would not care to have him violate such a trust, whioh is
the invariable practice ot nations.

He concluded:

"In view of

this, I believe that to further oomply with the above resolution
would be incompatible with the public interest.,,27
A heated debate followed, for the senate was far from satiafied with this reply of the President.

Finally, Senator Norris

proposed a resolution calculated to save the Senate's face, Whioh
allowed the treaty to be ratified, but with the olear and explioit
understanding that there were no secret papers or agreements tending to mOdify the terms of the treaty.

This measure, together

26Nelson MCGeary, ~ DeVelO~ment of conff:esaional
Investigative Power, (New York, l~o), I03-1o~
27Senate Dooument No. 216, 71st Congress, speoial Session 2.
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with the President's willingness to make the concession of allowing certain key senators to see the papers, secured the ratif1cation of the treaty.

On July 21, it was finally passed by a vote

of fifty-eight to nine. 28

28McGeary,
Power, 104.

!h!

Development

2t

Congressional Investigative

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Very little need be said at this pOint on the origin of the
power, as that has been sufficiently treated In Chapter II.
Though the power was not actually exercised until 1796 in connection with the Jay Treaty, the principles on which it rests were
established with President Washington's interpretation of the
constitutional dootrine of separatIon of powers in 1792.

Aooord-

ing to Washington and his cabInet, who foresaw that the deoision
they made would serve as a preoedent, four principles were set
down.

Their conclusIons were that:

• • • (1). the House was an inquest, and, therefore, might
instItute inquiries. (2). that they might call for papers
generally. (3). that the Executive ought to communicate
such papers as the public good would permit, and ought to
retuse those the disclosure ot which would injure the
public. Consequent17,were to exercise a discretion. (4).
that neither the co~e nor House had a right to call on
the head ot a deptmt, who and whose papers were under the
Presidt. a.lone, but that the oommee should instruot their
ohairman to move the house to address the PresIdent.
Careful study

or

the development of the power reveals that

in the 164 years of Its existence the norm set down by WashIngton
of compatibIlIty with the public Interest has been interpreted

1 Jefferson, writinsa, II, 213-14.
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in tive ditterent
. ways, or to put it ditferently, the precedents
examined group themselves in tive ditferent categories.

While it

is true that theoretically any President could introduce new
grounds for refusal by a new interpretation of what is demanded
by the public interest, nevertheless, the tact remains that presidents have been much more ready to tollow precedents already
established, than to set new ones themselvea.

The last real in-

novation in the power dates back to Lincoln's administration.
This tact, together with the reverence for tradition retlected in
numerous letters of Presidents and Attorneys-General citing precedents to justify their own actions, plus the apparent adequacy of
the power as it exists today, make innovation much less likely thM
it was one hundred or more years ago.

These tive categories repr&-

sent, then, the practical limitations ot the power as
veloped over the years and as it exists today.

i~

&as da-

It might be help-

ful to recall them briefly_
A frequent justitication of refusals has been to protect the
powers ot the Chiet Executive against congressional encroachment.
Thus the President may be detending his right to consult privately
and in contidence with a cabinet advisor, as did Jackson in 1833.
Or he may be protecting a particular power, such as the power to
remove otticials trom ottice, which Cleveland upheld in 1886.

Or

his refusal may be based simply on the constitutional right possessed by every citizen to retuse to testity against himself.
Such were the refusals of Jackson in 1837 and Grant in 1876.
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Another

~eason

which has been advanced quite otten,

espe~

oia11y in reoent years has been that the requested information
constItuted what in modern times has come to be known as "unevaluated evidence."

It will, no doubt, come as a surprise to

some to learn that the numerous refUsals of F.B.I. and state
Department tiles to congressional committees during the Truman
Administration were well-founded in

historic~l

precedent.

The

earliest Case of this type may be traced as far back as the
Jetferson administration, when in 1801 the President re!used to
tl:'anami t to the House evidence "containing such a mixture o!
.rumora, conjectures, and suspicions as renders it difficult to
sift out the real facts."2

Closely resembling this

ca.se were

the two cases which occurred in the administrations ot Presidents
Monroe and Jackson (1835).

Although the point at issue was not

the character at the evidence, the principle involved was nonethele.a the same, namely the protection ot the rights of the individual Citizen.
A third type of refuaal was the cry ot "confidential informat1ont! resorted to by Theodc;re Roosevelt, and after him by
Presidents Coolidge and Hoover.

The development of the power

along this line is particularly interesting.

Prior to Mr.

Roosevelt's refusal, no preaident had. ever put off a congressional request with such an air of casualness, and few with such
2Me88ases ~ Papers 2f ~ Fresidents, I, 400.
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sel1'-assurana, as these cases exhibIt.

Even Roosevelt went at

least so 1'ar as to explain that his action was prompted by his
concern that the "word or this Government to the individual be
kept sacred.")

Yet no such explanation accompanited the retusals

under Ooolidge in 1924 and Hoover in 1932, and in the latter aase
the Souse did not even see rit to comment on, much leas objeot to
the re1'usal, a good illustration of the strength the power had
gained by that time.
There was only one case or a retusal of in1'ormation 1'or
reasons 01' wartime security, that which took place early in the
administration or

~re8ident

Abraham Lincoln.

As for treaties with foreign powers and the seorecy usually
attendant on such negotiations, there were but two instances 01'
such a refusal.

The first, whioh ocourred in 1796 during Wash-

ing'on's disagreement with the House over the Jay Treaty, was
also the first time the power was ever exeroised under any oiroumstances.

The only other incident or this type did not take

plaoe until the administration of President Herbert Hoover in
1930.

Nevertheless, a striking development did take place within

this sphere ot usage.

Washington, it will be reoalled, refused

information to the House, which, as he stated at the time, does
not share in the treaty-makIng power.

Yet his letter indioates

that just as he had surrendered all requested information, even

3Letters

!! Archie

~. 306.
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secret, to the Senate at the time ot its deliberation, so too
would he have granted the request of the Rouse, had that body also
shared in the power over treatiea. 4 However, President Hoover did
not hesitate to refuse even the Senate in his exercise of the power 134 years later, a faot indioative of the growth ot the power
both within the sphere ot treaty negotiations. as well as in
general.
These then are the five oategories whioh show the bounds ot
the ¥resident's power to withhold information from Congress:
protectlon of the oonstitutional powers of the President against
congressional encroachment; protection ot the individual's right
to a fair trial by jurYJ confidential information; wartime
security, treaty secrecy.
Consideration should be given to one other aspect of the
power's development, and that concerns its extension to the heads
of Executive Departments.

It was the mind ot President W.ahing-

ton, as well as of hi. cabinet, that Congress neither could nor
should attempt to compel an executive otficial.

All requests were

to be directed to the President, who would then decide what should
be done by his lesser otficials. S Indeed, Secretary of War Knox
did appear before a congressional committee in 1792, but this
action was purely voluntary.
4Messases ~ Papers ~ ~ Presidents, I, 186-88.
5Jefferaon, Writ1ngs, II, 213-14.
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Neverthe~ess,

stated:

the House resolution adopted in 1837 boldly

"Resolved that the President of the United states be re-

quested and heads of the several departments
nish this committee with a list, etc • • • •

~

,.6

directed to furAlthough President

Jackson's reply allowed department heads to choose their own
course, it indicated that he would back up a refusal on their

par~

and the caS8 ended in a victory for the President before the issue
of department heads could deTelop much further.
Ho other refusals of information involved executive officers
other than the President until 1886, when the Senate concentrated
exclusively upon cabinet officers and espeCially on the Attorney
General in its requests.

President Grover Cleveland, it will be

recalled, was convinced that the Senate was trying to control
these heads of executive departments against the President, even
in executive matters.

Accordingly, he vigorously denied the

Senatets right to such a power and assumed all responsibility for
refusals made by lesser executive officials.
Yet the steadfast insistence ot Jackson and Cleveland on the
dependence of executive otticials on the President in this matter,
was not enough to establish the principle, for twenty years later
witnessed one of the most tlagrant attempts on the part of Congress
to force information from an executive official.

When the Senate

in 1909 directed the Attorney Gener_l to transmit certain
6Resister of Debates in the United States Oongress, 24th
Oongress, 2nd Session, XIII, Appendix, 199.
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intormation,
~ooa.velt

~e

slmply referred the demand to

~resident

Theodore

who replied 1n worda that have slnce become famous:

"Heads ot executIve departments are subject to the Constitution
end to the laws passed by the Congress in pursuance of the Constitut10n, and to the directions ot the i'resident or the United state.
fbut to no other direction whatever. n7

'!'he Senate then summoned

another executive orrioial or lesser stature, the Head of the Bureau or Oorporations, and threatened him with Imprisonment tor

contempt it he refused to hand over certain papera.

Roosevelt met

this challenge by taking personal possessIon ot all tbe des1red
papers and then makIng the refusal himae1t.

With this the Senate

backed down, and the .oat serIous effort to torce intormation from
department heads was deteated.

Congress bas never, either prior

or sub.equant to this Incident, successfully subpoened a department head, nor held one to be in oontempt. 8 This was the closest
they 8ver came to it, and

the1~

failure at this time marks the

turning pOint in the battle over department heada.
An
~

~15

epilogue came in 1932 when Secretary ot the Treasury

Mills refused oertain conEidential information to the House.

Oase is intereating for it shows the eompleteness ot the

President's victol7'.

The reason given by Mills

W8.S

vague and

briet; the oErieisl involved was one over whom past Congresses had
7Conspe.8ional Reeots, 60th Congress, 2nd Seasion, 527-8.
8Rdward s. Corwin. ..........
The rresident, Office. ______
and Powe~.,
'II. (New
York, 1941), 1)9.
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felt

~hey

had. a rather unique power, the Secretary of the

Treasur~

Nevertheless, the refusal was received without a single comment or
objection on the part of the House.

Since that time, no one has

disputed the tact tha.t 1n matters of requested 1nformation, department heads are identical w1th and hold the same power as the
President, as long as the Chief Execut1ve chooses to back them up.
The pr1ncipal, and possibly the only, disadvantage of the
President's power of refusal lies in the tact that the final decision as to whether the information in question would be compatible with the public interest rests with the President alone.

Even

it he is the person best qualified to determine this, it is immediately evident that such a provision does open the door to a
certain amount of abuse.

For example, such an abuse would occur

if the President were to retuse information in order to hide a
certain fraud within the Executive Department.

In that case, he

m1ght avow that his refusal waa d1ctated by a regard for the
publio interest.

Indeed 1t would be, as a protection ot rights

guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

But would not revelation of

the fraud be of greater immediate value to the nation's welfare?
This disadvantage is obvious t'rorn an examination of the very
nature of the power.

Yet 1n the analysis we have conducted of the

various historical cases, no evidence of such an abuse has been
detected.

In all the cases considered there are but two which

might arouse a few suspicions, the Jackson case of 1837, and that
under Theodore Roosevelt in 1909.

However, as already pointed out
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in the treatment of those case., no abuse could be proved, and

8.

the reasons for refusing the information were otberwise perfectly
in aoool'd with the principles laid down by Washington. the only
course i& to aocept them a& they stand.
This disadvantage of the power 18 undoubtedl,. otfset to a
certain degree by congress1onal power over legislation and appropr1ations.

Washington's second case

or

1796 has given us an ex-

cellent illustration of the pressure which the lIouse oan exert
upon a president.

Then too, thel'e is public opinion, whioh may be

stIrred up by Congress or by the rress.

In the Teapot Dome scan-

dal ot 1924, Attorn.,. General Harry M. Daugherty requested the sid

ot

~resident

~e8alonal

Coolidge 1n denling certain information to the oon-

investigating commIttee.

The fre.ident very wisely

refused this favor on the grounds that he could hardly rely on the
Attorney General'. word a. to what papers should be refused, aince
Daughepty was not in a posItion to otter dislntel'ested advice.
CoolIdge Bolved the problem by requesting Daugherty'. resignation,
and by followIng the advice ot his sucoessor.9

Had the Fresident

attempted to support his Attorney General, who was later convicted

or

fraud, Congres8 would certainly have probed all around the

s1tuatIon, raising a great deal ot suspicion in the public mind,
and eventually provating seriou. polItical difficultie. tor the

Exeoutive.
9Copsre •• lonal Reoord, 84th Oongress, 2nd seaalon. 9879.
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On the other side ot the ledger, there are a number ot distinot advantages to be found in this exeoutive power.

froteotion

ot the President's legitimate constitutional powers must always
b. considered an advantage ot great value under a government suoh

as ours.

So muoh depends on secrecy 1n time ot war, both in lives

and materials, that it is olearly an advantage tor the Commanderin-Chief to have the power ot enforcing wartime security.

It

would be a great handicap indeed if the fresident were torced to
reveal every piece of information, even the most confidential, to
congressional investigatIng oommittees.

As for the secreoy in-

volved in the negotiation ot a treaty, a great deal dependa on
Just what is kept secret, but

8S

this 1s a procedure absolutely

essential and neceasarT for the oonclusion of an agreement with a
foreign power, it must be oonoeded that there is some advantage in
the ¥residentts maintenance ot it.
Always an important consideration, and just a& much at an
advantage today

8S

ever, is the confidential relation between the

rresident and his advisers.
at

le~u.t

Three presidents mentioned this

8S

a secondary reason tor their refusals ot information,

Jackson in 1833, Cleveland, and Tyler.

Yet this confidential re-

lationship would not last long 1t Congress had the pover to demand an account of the advice given by an adviser.

For advisers

will aoon cease to be of any value it they oannot be guaranteed
that what they sayar write will be held 1n oonfidence;

"that the

man or the oftice they advise w111 appreCiate the fact that they
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are expressing opinions and that, probably, they are not the only
one. asked for opinions and advice.

The minute an effort 1. made

• • • to determine wbether the opin1ons or the advioe on which a

decision waa made was 'right', (with retribution and oritioism
tor those wbo were not 'right') independent thought whioh alone
produoe. sound decisions will be stymied or kl1led. u10
The last advantageot the power and undoubtedly the fIOst important today, tor Just about every recent case of refusal haa
been.for this re.son, 1s the protection it enable. the President
to give to the individual from oongress1onal investigating committe...

The efforts ot these oommittees to remove subver.ive

el.ments trom the Government are certainly deserving ot praise,
but it haB happened that, througb an excess of zeal and possibly
a certa1n amount of thoughtlessness, oommittees have sought tiles
and information from various exeout1ve d.epaI'tments whioh contained
large amount. ot nun.valuated evidence."

This term was explained

by Attorney General Robert Jaokson 1n 1941 and again by Mr. J.
Edgar Hoover, Director ot the F'ederal Bureau
1950.

Said Jackson ot such F.B. I. tiles:

or

Investigat10n 1n

uDisclosure

or informa-

tion oontained in the reports might 81so be the grossest kind ot
injustice to innooent individuals.

Investigative reports inolude

lOHar17 S. Truman, M.emoirs, Vol. II:
Hope, (Garden City, 1956), 454.

of Trial
_.Years .......

and
............
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leads and suspicions, and aometimes even the statementa of
malicious or misinformed people."ll

This statement, and another

made by fr.aident Truman in which he expressed the spirit of the
Loyalty Program inaugurated 1n 1947 as suoh that "rUlllOr" gossip,
or susp1cion will not be 8urricient to lead to the dismissal of
any employe. tor disloyalty,n12 are strikingly reminiscent of the
words or '!'homas Jet.terson in 1807.

We recall hi,ls> refusal to hand

over to the House certain information because it contained "SUCh
a m1xture of rumors, conjectures, end suspicions 8S renders it

difficult to s1tt out the real racts."l)

This protect1on ot' the

constitut1onal rights of the indiv1dual has become one of the outstanding advantages ot the President fS power to refuse in,formation
In oonclusion, we should like to point out onoe more that
this theais is not intended
of the problem.

8S

a treatment of the legal aspects

Neither does it propose any alteration of the

fresident's power to refuse information to Congress,

88

that power

exists today. for this belongs to the realm of politioal science.
It is merely an historical treatment of certain precedents which

llAlan Barth, ~ LoXa1tl 2! !£!!~, (New York, 1951) 159.
1211athaniel Weyl, ~ Battle Aiainat Disloyaltz, (Hew York,
1951), 187.
1)Me8Sagea

!!!S.

Papers

2!. !!:!!.

Presidents, I, ltOo.

81
have occurred" in history. made with a view to deterll'lining the
origin of the power. the

developll~ent

of the power up to the

present til". and the advantages and dleadvantages in that power
8S

history presents them.
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